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Abstract
Autonomous driving vehicles (ADVs) are implemented with rich software functions and equipped with many
sensors, which in turn brings broad attack surface. Moreover, the execution environment of ADVs is often
open and complex. Hence, ADVs are always in risk of safety and security threats. This paper proposes a fast
method calledMulti-IF , using multiple invocation features of system calls to detect anomalies in self-driving
systems. Since self-driving functions take most of the computation resources and upgrade frequently, Multi-
IF is designed to work under such resource constraints and support frequent updates. Given the collected
sequences of system calls, the combination of different syntax patterns is used to analyze and construct
feature vectors of those sequences. By taking the feature vectors as inputs, one-class support vector machine
is adopted to determine whether the current sequence of system calls is abnormal, which is trained with the
feature vectors from the normal sequences. The evaluations on both simulated and real data prove that the
proposed method is effective in identifying the abnormal behavior after minutes of feature extraction and
training. Further comparisons with the existing methods on the ADFA-LD data set also validate that the
proposed approach achieves a higher accuracy with less time overhead.
Keywords: Anomaly Detection, Autonomous Vehicles, System Calls, Support Vector Machine
1. Introduction
Automobiles have been smarter than ever, resulting in the application of autonomous driving vehicles
(ADVs). Current ADVs are equipped with many intelligent devices, such as dozens of electrical control
units (ECUs), a variety of sensors, and powerful computing platforms.
However, with the higher degree of autonomy, safety and security problems are escalated due to the
complex software and the increased exposure of functionality to the adversaries. On one hand, potential
software bugs may lead to runtime errors, which put pedestrians, passengers, and vehicles at risk. According
to the open Autonomous Vehicle Disengagement Reports [12], functional errors and system failures are the
main causes of disengagement handling. On the other hand, the broad attack surface makes intrusion
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possible. For example, the vehicular networks, such as the vehicle to everything networks (V2X), Bluetooth,
Wi-Fi hot spots, cellular networks, keyless entry systems, etc., make it possible for attackers to breach
into the ADV system. Back in 2015, researchers hacked a running Jeep Cherokee by embedding a trojan
program into one of its ECUs [14]. In 2016, another group of researchers intruded a vehicle through a
malicious application installed in the Android-based car-play system [7], which could directly take control
of the running car by fabricating control messages over the vehicular bus. Keen Security Lab at Tencent
successfully intruded a Tesla Model S remotely by exploiting a vulnerability of the embedded web browser
in the central information display in 2016 [24]. And they breached into a BMW i3 electric vehicle by
compromising the telematics unit in 2018 [19].
Anomaly detection becomes a vital task in an ADV to guarantee its safe motion. Several mitigation
measures have been proposed for some specific attacks, such as GPS spoofing and in-car communication
fabrication. However, as one of the most critical parts of an ADV, there is little work on the mitigation of
the self-driving software system. The self-driving software system (often referred to as self-driving systems)
of an ADV conducts the software control logic of the vehicle, which performs most of the tasks during the
motion, such as sensing the surrounding environment, planning the route, controlling the trajectory, etc.
More importantly, it is the only one generating control inputs to the ADV’s actuators/ECUs. Thus, anomaly
detection, as well as related protection, becomes more crucial and urgent to secure the self-driving system.
However, compared with general software systems, the anomaly detection for self-driving systems remains
a challenging task for the following reasons.
• Large-scale and complex software architecture. Self-driving systems are usually massive, e.g., the open-
source project Autoware1 contains over 270k lines of code, and Baidu Apollo2 has over 240k lines in its
main functional modules currently. Together with ECUs and other systems (e.g. car-play system), the
software scale of an ADV becomes tremendous. The complexity of the software is also inherent to the
massive functions of ADVs. To guarantee safe driver-less motion, a self-driving system needs to perform
many tasks, such as object detection and tracking, localization, motion planning, and data fusion, each
of which is a complicated task. Their integration makes the whole system more complex. Moreover, the
self-driving system needs to continuously interact with actuators and the environment.
• Complex and open environment. Usually, the execution environment of an ADV, which is also the input
space of the self-driving system, is with higher complexity. On one hand, the environment is open
and contains many unsafe factors, such as obstacles. On the other hand, the environment is dynamic
and partially unknown due to the existence of dynamic surrounding objects, such as other vehicles and
pedestrians. It is often challenging to accurately predict and track their occurrences/motion.
1http://github.com/CPFL/Autoware
2http://github.com/ApolloAuto/apollo
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• Non-deterministic behavior. In a self-driving system, different (machine) learning algorithms/models are
applied to complete some tasks, such as object detection. Given the same data, different models may
be obtained after the training phase. The outputs of those models are challenging to predict, and the
related components may react differently to the same input at different time instances. Besides, due to
the limitation of mechanisms’ accuracy, a vehicle may perform the result of a self-driving system with
some tolerant disturbance. Hence, the motion of a vehicle, controlled by the self-driving system, may
not be repeated exactly under the same (road) environment. Due to the non-determinism, the validation
of system behaviors is also challenging (especially for the logic-/specification-based detection), as it is
difficult to determine the normal disturbance of outputs between the vehicle and validation system, or
the real output and specification.
In this paper, we propose a fast and “inexpensive” approach called Multi-IF , which utilizes multiple
invocation features of system calls (syscalls) to detect anomalies in self-driving systems. First, the sequence
of syscalls is used to model the program behavior. Syscall invocation is the essential programmatic way
for user programs to directly request any privileged operations from the operating system kernel. It has
long been used in host-based intrusion detection systems, program profiling, malware analysis, etc. Second,
the syntax feature of syscall traces is extracted and analyzed to build an SVM based classifier. Anomaly
detection is essentially a classification problem. The classifier should ideally learn from the normal behavior
to set up the baseline, by which a pending trace can be examined whether it is compliant or not. Thus,
the one-class SVM is chosen due to its wide application in solving such issues. At last, experiments are
conducted on the real data from both our self-driving car and ADFA-LD [9] data set. The evaluation shows
that our approach achieves a high detection accuracy with minimal false alerts on the monitoring of self-
driving functions. Comparisons with existing works on the ADFA-LD data set proves that such an approach
can achieve high detection accuracy and efficiency, and reduces the time overhead.
Multi-IF is inexpensive as 1) it combines cheap syntax features from testing data to achieve a more
accurate detection engine; 2) the training is faster as it adopts an SVM-based solution (will be described in
Section 4.3). Note that with an inexpensive approach, it is necessary to not only work under the limitation of
the onboard computer since most computation capability and resource should be allocated to perform basic
functionalities for safe motion, but also meet the requirement of rapid system/program update (e.g., Tesla
Autopilot updates up to hundreds of times for a build in one year [2]), which also demands the detection
engine to be upgraded quickly.
The contribution of this paper includes:
• We propose a syscall based method to model self-driving systems and prove it is effective, instead of
looking into the complex software architecture and environment.
• By extracting multiple syntax features from syscall sequences, we show they can be used in a one-class
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SVM based classification to perform anomaly detection in self-driving systems.
• The proposed approach achieves better performance and requires low training costs than existing similar
methods on the ADFA-LD data set.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 states the related work. Section 3 briefs
preliminaries as well as the motivation of this work. Section 4 presents the detail of our approach. Section 5
shows the evaluation results. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 6. For the review purpose, all code
and data could be found in https://bitbucket.org/chengkunbuaa/avdetection_code/.
2. Related Work
Attacks and protection in cyber-physical systems. Mitchell et al [27] proposed an adaptive
specification-based intrusion detection system (IDS) to detect malicious unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
in an airborne system. Such an IDS monitored the output of embedded sensors and actuators, then defined
behavior rules from their threat model. Vuong et al [35] developed a decision tree-based method to detect
cyber attacks on a small robotic vehicle and tested it with both cyber and physical attacks. The conclusion
was that adding physical features could help improve detection accuracy. Moosbrugger et al [28] performed
runtime monitoring on UAVs to detect threats such as the denial of service (DoS) or GPS spoofing by
monitoring commands, signals, software behaviors, and so on. Choi et al [8] proposed to use control
invariants to detect external physical attacks by using a proportional-integral-derivative (PID) controller
to examine whether the runtime behavior matches the controller. However, those solutions require either
pre-defined errors (e.g., decision tree solution) or detailed analysis of source code and binary executable files
(e.g., control invariant modeling), which hinders the application in large systems. Besides, F. Guo et al [15]
used sensor data consistency and frequency to detect abnormal execution in autonomous driving networks.
K. Zhu et al [40] proposed an anomaly detection approach based on the long short-term memory (LSTM)
network to check any CAN bus traffic from the time and data dimension, which resulted in a satisfactory
accuracy.
Moreover, a variety of methods have been proposed to counter attacks against sensors or communication
in vehicles. For example, Park et al [29] used pairwise inconsistencies between sensors to detect transient
attacks or faults for GPS receivers. Kar et al [18] proposed an automated detection and vehicle identification
system to mitigate GPS interference on the vehicle tracking system. However, neither method was applicable
as either multiple sensors or specific roadside units were required. Cho and Shin [7] revealed a new type of
DoS attack, which was caused by the vulnerability in in-vehicle networks and could disable ECUs via the
error-handling mechanism. However, the detection and mitigation required accurate time synchronization.
Bouard et al [3] proposed a decentralized information control approach to enhancing the security and privacy
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of in-car communication based on the deployed authentication framework for each ECU. Woo et al [36]
proposed an encryption and authentication protocol to protect the CAN bus. However, the performance
overhead of authentication in [3, 36] limits their practical adoption. Recently, Steger et al proposed a
framework for secure and dependable wireless software update on ECUs [33], which utilized IEEE 802.11s
mesh network and deployed a cryptography solution. However, no internal computation platform security
concerns such as system intrusion were considered.
Syscall-based anomaly detection. Syscalls have long been used with anomaly detection or signature-
based detection in host-based intrusion detection systems [13]. Anomaly detection often suffers from high the
false-positive rate since it is difficult to establish a perfect baseline. That is because the software execution
is highly dynamic, and the complexity of modern computer systems makes it even harder to gather and
process all normal execution data. However, anomaly detection still plays an important role in defense as it
assumes no prior knowledge of potential attacks, which greatly differs itself from signature-based detection.
Signature-based detection usually offers a low false alarm rate and high accuracy for the attacks that match
the pre-collected data templates, but it cannot deal with unseen attacks. Moreover, it relies on the accurate
signature gathered from the attack evidence, which increases the application difficulty in a new system.
For syscall based intrusion detection, language modeling techniques are widely used [13, 4]. Among the
recent anomaly detection works, Marteau [26] defined the covering similarity to measure a testing symbolic
trace against a bunch of (normal) traces, which was used to identify the abnormal sequences. However, since
testing on ADFA-LD reached the best result when all 833 training traces and an additional 1000 traces from
the validation set were used, such an approach acquired a rich feature set. Besides, [26] tended to extract and
build the optimal covering sets using all subsequences in the evaluation (though optimized algorithms were
proposed). By contrast, our approach reduces the pattern and feature sets by adopting the proposed 3-step
method in Section 4.3, which cuts down the storage and training overhead. Khreich et al [22] combined
different detection methods, namely the Sequence Time-Delay Embedding (STIDE), Hidden Markov Model
(HMM), and one-class SVM to improve the accuracy. Although computing the combination of different
detectors was fast, training all detectors was computing-intensive and time-consuming. Creech et al [11]
used context-free semantic features in syscall traces, together with an extreme learning machine, to build
a neural network based classifier. They achieved almost the perfect performance on the KDD98 data set,
but the approach was computational heavy, which took weeks to extract the semantic features and days for
training. With the semantic features and SVM, they also achieved a good result on the ADFA-LD data
set. Xie et al [39, 37] used syntax features, such as the length of a syscall trace and the relative frequency
of individual calls, and the k-NN and k-mean clustering models to achieve acceptable results. In another
work [38], they used short sequences and frequencies to train a one-class SVM classifier, which improved
the accuracy. Haider et al [16] used four statistical features in a trace, i.e., the least/most repeated and
the minimum/maximum values, to detect attacks. Three learning algorithms were applied to improve the
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performance over Xie’s works while achieving a fast training, including SVM with linear kernels, SVM with
radial basis kernels and k-NN. Huorong et al. [31] segmented sequence data by a sliding window to build a
dynamic Markov model to analyze their simulated data set and an airport traffic data set, which improved
the adaptability and stability when compared with the classical Markov approaches. On the UNM data
set, Hoang et al [17] proposed to use the Hidden Markov model to examine normal syscall sequences and
generate four pattern sets. Khreich et al [21] used various n-grams and their frequencies as features, which
was exactly the complete large pattern set (all L-k clusters) extracted in Section 4.2. However, it would
lead to enormous feature vector space (e.g. there were 142,190 features when N=6). And as the average
Euclidean distance was used to determine the similarity of a testing trace to all normal sequences, it would
involve a large amount of computation. Fuzzy rules are applied to check whether the tested trace is normal
or not by considering the produced probability and pattern frequencies. Results showed they reduced the
false alarm rate by almost a half. Although the above studies have made remarkable contributions to the
host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS), they are either time/resource-consuming or less accurate,
which are too imperfect to be used in ADVs. Thus, a faster and more accurate detection method is required
for the current defense system for ADV.
3. Preliminaries and Motivation
3.1. The Self-Protection Framework for ADVs
Robot Operating System (ROS), built on the top of the Linux kernel, is an open-source and flexible
framework for developing robot control systems, which is prevailing in robotics. Currently, we have been
working on a self-protection framework with great flexibility and extensibility for ROS-based self-driving
systems [6]. In this framework, hardware-assisted virtualization was used to isolate different software com-
ponents of a self-driving system. Each isolated software component, referred to as a partition, is equipped
with a self-protection subsystem to inspect the partition execution and plan mitigation measures.
As an important part of the efforts made to secure the cyber world of autonomous driving platforms.
The anomaly detection is designed to handle those possible threats from both inside and outside, such as
malicious intrusion (e.g., a compromised partition image during cloud update) or runtime faults in a partition
(may lead to system failure/malfunctioning). Together with the efforts made in securing the physical world
(the motion-based detection), we hope to build a complete model to better explain the overall status of
the vehicle, and to locate the possible root cause of any detected abnormal functioning of the whole CPS
system.
To secure the cyber world, anomaly detection becomes vital. The main steps to detect abnormal execution
are selecting proper information to monitor and proposing a proper analysis method to check whether the
monitored information is correct. Due to the complexity of architecture and program/code logic in self-
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driving systems, monitoring and analyzing the execution of each partition directly may be challenging.
Critical execution paths may serve the monitoring well, but it is also important to remain stealthy and
do not alert the intruder. Thus, code instrument solutions are not suitable for our purpose. Inspired by
the virtual machine introspection (VMI) based techniques [30, 23], the sequence of syscalls invoked by a
partition should be a good choice to develop new methods to extend and improve the current MAPE loop.
3.2. Syscall and Anomaly Detection
Modern Linux kernel provides over 300 syscalls [1], which are used by running processes to interact
with the operating system kernel. On one hand, the usage of syscalls is determined by the program source
code and the libraries it relies on; on the other hand, the invocation sequence of syscalls is highly dynamic
and determined by the program logic and input data. Hence, syscall sequences are often used for (host-
based) intrusion detection in systems [4], under the assumption that only running processes can harm the
system and any damage can happen only through privileged operations. Language models are prevalent for
syscall-based intrusion detection, where sequential features, such as n-grams, are often used to build various
detection engines.
Anomaly detection plays an important role in defense as it does not assume the prior knowledge of
potential attacks. It usually works by first establishing a baseline for the behavior of the protected targets.
Ideally, if such a baseline is sufficiently accurate, any anomaly will be identified as a real threat. But
establishing such a perfect baseline is difficult and sometimes impractical, since 1) the software execution
environment is highly open, dynamic, and complex, and 2) the complexity of modern software systems
makes it even harder to gather and process all normal execution data. It is often required to upgrade the
detection engine regularly with more evidence (training data) either online (e.g. semi-supervised learning)
or offline (e.g. retraining). However, the online upgrade is challenging as it is difficult to distinguish a
rare-seen normal trace from real threats. Thus, we try to accelerate the offline upgrade by reducing the
training overhead, which is also what “inexpensive” here stands for.
3.3. Support Vector Machine
Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a supervised machine learning model for classification and regression.
The basic idea of SVM for linear classification is to determine optimal hyperplanes to maximize the margin
between any different groups of data. In case they cannot be separated linearly, SVM uses kernel functions to
map the data into a higher-dimensional space such that they can be separated in the new space. One-class
SVM is essentially a regular binary-class SVM where all training data belongs to the same class. There
are two popular kinds of one-class SVMs: one-class SVM according to Scho¨lkopf, where the boundary is a
hyperplane [32], and another one according to Tax and Duin, where the boundary is a sphere [34]. One-class
SVM is popular for anomaly detection as we conclude in Section 2.
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In a self-driving platform such as mentioned in Sec. 3.1, GPU is exclusively used by the object detection
function (in our platform it is done via device passthrough). Moreover, it is tedious to maintain and update
traditional intrusion detection systems installed on every host, which requires approaches that can reduce the
time overhead while keeping the acceptable detection accuracy [25]. As it is critical to develop a lightweight
detection engine that would not potentially consume too many resources or introduce too much overhead,
SVM-based approaches are preferred in this work.
4. Methodology
The detection goal here is to identify the abnormal execution trace from the normal ones. As described
in [11], given the set of valid subsequences, called patterns, extracted from normal traces, the occurrence
of these subsequences in a new normal trace is significantly greater than those in an abnormal one. Hence,
the appearance of syscall patterns in a pending trace is vital to detect anomalies. There are two main steps
for such pattern-based detection. The first one is pattern extraction. In this work, the subsequences of
contiguous syscalls are used as patterns. How to find a proper set of subsequences with different lengths
is the first important thing for accurate prediction. The second one is building the detection engine . As
abnormal behavior is rare but catastrophic in self-driving systems, the training data is collected from the
clean and safe execution of the target system. Hence, how to use normal data to get a classifier to detect
abnormal data is another challenge. In this section, details of the proposed method will be presented.
4.1. The Framework of the Proposed Method
Let Σ be the set of all allowed syscalls by the kernel. Given the kernel source code, Σ is a finite
and deterministic set. For example, as defined in /usr/include/x86 64-linux-gnu/asm/unistd 64.h, Ubuntu
kernel 4.4.108 x64 contains 326 syscalls, such as ‘0’ for ‘read ’, ‘1’ for ‘write’ and ‘96’ for ‘gettimeofday’.
An invocation trace, denoted as pi, is a time-ordered sequence of syscalls, i.e., pi = {ξ1, ξ2, . . .}, where
pi[i] = ξi ∈ Σ.
Fig. 1 shows the whole structure of the proposed method. Suppose St is a set of normal syscall traces,
and S is the testing set containing both normal and abnormal syscall traces. Our method includes two steps.
The first one is pattern discovery and feature extraction from St. This step performs the preprocessing of
the raw syscall sequences in St and generates the inputs for decision making. We first extract and build the
set of patterns from the normal data. Then we classify those patterns into different clusters based on their
length, and calculate their frequencies in a trace as the features of this trace. The second step is to train a
detection engine. Since the amount of normal data is usually larger than that of abnormal data, we adopt
one-class SVM to construct the decision engine. The input to the detection engine is the extracted feature
vectors of syscall traces.
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Fig. 1: Anomaly detection procedure.
4.2. Feature Extraction
Before diving into details, some basic definitions applied in this paper shall be given. Based on the
n-gram model, patterns can be defined by Definition 1.
Definition 1 (Pattern). Given a set of normal syscall traces St = {pit : ∀t}, a syscall pattern is a k-gram
in St, denoted as pi
k
j , where 1 ≤ k ≤ maxt |pit|. The set of all patterns is denoted as Ψ = ∪k ∪j {pi
k
j }.
The scale of patterns extracted from normal traces may be very large. The direct application of these
patterns may cause high dimensions of the input data for training and detection, which could result in
unnecessary overhead. Hence, further clustering is applied to reduce the number of used patterns.
Definition 2 (L-k Cluster). Given the pattern set Ψ, its L-k cluster, denoted as Γk, is the set of all
k-grams in Ψ, i.e., Γk = ∪j:pik
j
∈Ψ{pi
k
j }. All clusters in Ψ are denoted as Φ = {Γk1 ,Γk2 , . . . ,Γkm}.
Based on this definition, all patterns in a cluster Γk have the same sequence length k.
Definition 3 (Feature). Given the clusters {Γk1 , Γk2 , . . ., Γkm}, the feature of Γk is defined as the fre-
quency of Γk in a trace pi, denoted as fΓk(pi). fΓk(pi) =
∑
pik
j
∈Γk
fpik
j
(pi)/|pi|, where fpik
j
(pi) is the frequency
of pikj in pi, and |pi| is the number of syscalls in pi.
9
Algorithm 1 Feature extraction for L-k cluster.
Input:
k: an integer denotes the length
St: the training data set
S: the testing data set
1: function build set(St, k)
2: Γk ← ∅
3: for each π ∈ St do
4: for i = 1 : |π| − k + 1 do
5: if π[i, i+ k − 1] not in Γk then
⊲ π[i, i+ k − 1] is the subsequence of syscalls from the i-th syscall to (i+ k − 1)-th syscall in π.
6: add π[i, i+ k − 1] into Γk
7: return Γk
⊲ function to compute the frequency of Γk in a given trace π
8: function eval trace(π, Γk)
9: fΓk (π)← 0
10: for each πkj ∈ Γk do
11: f(πkj ) = the times that π
k
j appears in π;
12: fΓk (π)← fΓk (π) + f(π
k
j );
13: return fΓk (π)← fΓk (π)/|π|;
For example, given a set of normal syscall traces, suppose Γ3 = {(22, 1, 1), (0, 22, 23), (1, 96, 1),
(96, 5, 128)} and Γ5 = {(0, 22, 23, 1, 5), (96, 5, 128, 4, 34), (1, 5, 96, 5, 1)}. If there exists a trace pi = {0,
22, 23, 1, 5, 96, 5, 128, 4, 34}, then we have fΓ3(pi) = 2/10 = 0.2, fΓ5(pi) = 2/10 = 0.2.
Pattern cluster building. The first thing for feature extraction is to build the set of L-k clusters. Given
a value k, the construction of Γk can be described by function BUILD SET(St, k) (Lines 1−7) in Algorithm
1, where Lines 3−6 show the extraction of k-grams in each trace pi. More specifically, the algorithm first
searches for all k-grams in one trace from the first k contiguous syscalls to the last k contiguous syscalls.
Hence, there are total |pi| − k + 1 iterations of Lines 4−6 for a trace pi. Once it completes on the current
trace, the algorithm switches to check the next one, until all traces in St are processed.
Take a normal trace pi = {ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, ξ4, ξ1, ξ2, ξ3} as an example to illustrate the performed Line 4−6.
Suppose k = 3 and currently Γ3 = ∅. Since |pi| = 7, Lines 4−6 will be iterated 5 times to generate Γ3 from
pi. For the first iteration, the 3-gram is ξ1ξ2ξ3 , pi
3
1 . Since Γ3 = ∅, pi
3
1 is added to Γ3, resulting in Γ3 = {pi
3
1}.
The next 3-gram is ξ2ξ3ξ4 , pi
3
2 . Since pi
3
2 is not in Γ3, Γ3 = {pi
3
1 , pi
3
2}. Similarly, ξ3ξ4ξ1 , pi
3
3 and ξ4ξ1ξ2 , pi
3
4
are added to Γ3 sequentially, generating Γ3 = {pi31 , pi
3
2 , pi
3
3 , pi
3
4}. The last iteration checks the final 3-gram in
pi, i.e., ξ1ξ2ξ3. As it has been in Γ3, there is no need to add it again.
Feature extraction. In this paper, the frequency of each cluster is used as features to characterize the
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property of a trace. Based on Definition 3, given a trace pi, the frequency of Γk can be computed by function
EVAL TRACE(pi, Γk) (Lines 8−13) in Algorithm 1. For each pattern pikj in Γk, the function first counts the
number of its occurrence in pi (Line 11), and then updates fΓk(pi) (Line 12). Since different traces may have
different lengths, the absolute amounts of occurrence of Γk in different traces may be significantly different,
which can cause bias during training and prediction. Hence, we normalize the occurrence amount of Γ in a
trace by dividing the trace length, i.e., Line 13 in Algorithm 1.
By checking all Γk in Φ, we can count their frequencies in a trace. Hence, given an arbitrary pi, we can
measure it via the following m-dimensional vector.
f(π) = (fΓk1
(π), fΓk2
(π), ..., fΓkm (π))
T (1)
where m = ‖Φ‖ and fΓki (pi) is computed from EVAL TRACE(pi, Γki). Clearly, with (1), we can translate
the trace space to a subset of Rm, where Rm is the m-dimensional Euclidean space. Suppose the translated
spaces of St and S are Ωt and Ω, respectively.
4.3. One-Class SVM based model training
In this paper, we use a popular tool called LIBSVM[5]. As pointed out by [20], the method of Scho¨lkopf
et al. [32] and the SVDD method of Tax and Duin [34] operate comparably and both perform best when the
Gaussian kernel is used in practical implementations, we choose one-class SVM (OCSVM) with (Gaussian)
radial basis function (RBF) to train the prediction model with the normal data. Such one-class SVMs
applied here is according to Scho¨lkopf’s work. By walking through the SVM model, we clearly explain what
parameters are required and how they are determined.
In LIBSVM[5], training an OCSVM model with RBF kernel is to solve (2).
min
α
1
2
n∑
i,j=1
αiαj exp(−µ||xi − xj ||
2)
s.t. 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1/(nν) (2)
eTα = nν
where αi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, are Lagrange multipliers or dual variables, and α = (α1, α2, . . . , αn)
T ; e = [1, ..., 1]T
is the vector of all ones, µ = 1/||xi|| by default. Thus, ν is the only one required to be tuned. Because
different ν may generate various optimization problems of (2), which in turn affect the solution of αi. Here,
We use the grid search method to determine ν from the set {0.5 (default), 0.2, 0.1, 0.005, 0.001, 0.0005,
0.0001}, which is collected in early attempts.
In this paper, each input xi for the OCSVM is a vector in Ωt or Ω. Specifically, the data in Ωt is used to
train the SVM model, and that in Ω is used to test the trained model. For each trace pii, its feature vector
is xi = (f1, f2, . . . , fm)
T . If pii is a normal trace, then xi is labeled as +1, otherwise labeled as −1. Thus,
11
Fig. 2: Procedure of training the detection model.
given xi and its label, the input format for LIBSVM can be written as {label 1 : f1 2 : f2 ... m : fm},
where label = +1 or −1.
Given a set of normal syscall traces, the simplest way to determine the clusters is to select all possible
lengths, from 1 to the length of the longest trace. However, the number of clusters may also become very
large. Hence, to optimize the training cost and detection effectiveness, we need to deal with the following
issues in practice.
• The dimension of input data. The number of clusters to be selected for feature extraction has to be
decided properly since it determines the dimension of data space of SVM, which affects the training
cost significantly.
• The combination of different clusters. The feature vector is based on the cluster set Φ. Different
combinations of clusters will result in various training data, which directly affect the performance of
classification. Thus, a proper set of clusters has to be determined.
To solve the above issues, a 3-step method is proposed to choose the clusters and get a proper combination
to train a detection model. The whole procedure is shown in Fig. 2. In the sequel, we take the ADFA Linux
12
Table 1: ADFA-LD early results on different clusters (step 1) [%].
k
ν 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.05 0.01
FAR DR FAR DR FAR DR FAR DR FAR DR
1 30.695 77.748 12.557 28.150 5.993 11.528 5.672 10.456 4.414 8.847
2 65.027 66.890 8.669 7.775 4.071 4.155 2.653 4.558 1.212 3.619
3 40.096 78.954 15.256 41.957 6.725 33.780 5.833 33.110 4.140 30.831
4 42.864 92.627 27.196 67.024 21.523 62.064 19.511 61.260 17.383 60.188
5 72.210 98.257 34.149 93.566 31.084 89.678 28.454 87.265 26.189 84.316
6 74.909 99.330 40.393 98.794 36.002 95.040 34.218 92.895 31.999 92.493
7 77.493 99.598 43.207 98.928 38.701 95.174 36.848 93.164 35.522 93.164
8 80.764 99.866 48.605 98.525 42.978 95.040 40.714 93.164 38.426 93.164
9 60.476 99.732 53.088 96.381 48.399 94.370 45.334 93.700 43.435 93.700
10 61.528 99.732 53.728 96.381 50.114 94.504 46.935 93.834 44.831 93.834
11 63.701 99.464 54.140 95.576 51.189 94.102 49.062 93.834 47.027 93.834
12 64.478 97.185 54.872 94.906 52.196 93.834 50.160 93.834 47.850 93.834
13 65.599 97.051 56.176 94.504 52.722 93.834 50.595 93.834 48.673 93.700
14 65.759 98.257 58.326 94.906 55.627 94.102 51.715 93.968 49.611 93.700
15 67.109 98.257 58.875 96.113 55.855 94.102 53.317 93.834 50.069 93.834
data set (ADFA-LD) [9] as an illustrative example to show a heuristic process for cluster selection.
4.3.1. Probing potential clusters
To find out a proper set of clusters, the first step is to test the classification performance by taking the
features of a single cluster (as shown in Fig. 2, whose length varies from 1 to 20, as inputs and checking
with different ν, ν ∈ {0.5, 0.2, 0.1, 0.05, 0.01}. The results are shown in Table 1. As our goal is to distinguish
abnormal traces from normal ones, as well as to easily compare the final result with those published by
similar researches [11, 26, 39, 37, 38, 16], the detection focuses on the false alarm rate (FAR) and detection
rate (DR), whose definitions are given in (3),
DR =
# of Correctly Detected Abnormal Traces
# of Abnormal Traces
=
TP
TP + FN
FAR =
# of Wrongly Detected Abnormal Traces
# of Normal Traces
=
FP
FP + TN
(3)
where TP , TN , FP and FN stand for the numbers of true positives, true negatives, false positives, and
false negatives, respectively, regarding an abnormal trace as a positive result, as shown in Table 2.
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Table 2: Meanings of TP , TN , FP and FN .
Actual
Detected Abnormal
(Positive)
Normal
(Negative)
Total
Abnormal TP FN N2
Normal FP TN N1
4.3.2. Determining the optimal clusters
The second step is to choose the candidate set and test each possible combination, as shown in Fig. 2.
The key here is to decide the maximum pattern length Kmax based on the results from the first step. The
goal of increasing k is to achieve better performance. On one hand, increasing k could eventually yield more
feature data, which generally benefits the training, if it can increase DR and suppress (decrease or at least
no to increase quickly) FAR. On the other hand, k should be capped to lower the storage and computation
overhead once the increment of k does little help in differentiating DR and FAR.
From the observation of early results presented in step-1 (e.g., Table 1), it is a general trend that during
the given range of k probed in the first step: for each given ν, 1) both DR and FAR increase with the growth
of k before they reach the utmost; 2) the increment becomes slow when they are reaching the utmost. In
such a situation, Kmax can be decided by analyzing the change rate (∆) of DR and FAR, which can be
described as (4).
∆DRk,ν = DRk,ν −DRk−1,ν , (4)
∆FARk,ν = FARk,ν − FARk−1,ν , k = 2, 3, 4, ..., N
where N is the range of k probed in the first step. Thus, Kmax can be decided by (5).
Kmax = argmin
k
∆k,ν (5)
s.t ∆k,ν =∆
DR
k,ν −∆
FAR
k,ν < 0, k = 2, 3, . . . , N.
According to (5), k = Kmax is the very point where ∆k,ν decreases most, which means that keeping
increasing k (while k > Kmax) helps little in differentiating DR and FAR in the given range of k presented
in the first step.
Back to the example, as shown in Table 1, FAR and DR almost stop increasing (or we could say the
increment is little) when k > 9. Thus, the clusters from L-1 to L-9 can form a candidate set for potential
feature extraction, as they yield better detection performance. When searching for a proper set of clusters,
possible combinations can range from 2 clusters to 9 clusters in this case. Indeed, for m selected clusters,
there are
∑m
j=2 C
j
m = 2
m−(m+1) combinations. Since the computation of feature (i.e., cluster’s frequency)
is independent, evaluating a trace with multiple clusters can be directly done by collecting the frequency of
every single cluster from the step-1, and concatenating them to get new input data for the SVM model. For
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example, suppose the frequencies of L-3, L-4 and L-7 clusters are f1, f2 and f3 in a given trace individually, we
can get a new 3-dimensional data consisting of those clusters to describe this trace, by directly concatenating
them:
label 1 : f1 2 : f2 3 : f3
As reducing operation takes O(1) time complexity, we can try different combinations with brute force.
Given the fact that training and evaluating an SVM takes only seconds as shown in our evaluation,
trying all possibilities depends on the number of cluster combinations. Thus, the training with multiple sets
takes O(2m) time complexity, where m = Kmax. Back to the example, When such an approach was applied
to ADFA-LD, it took minutes (wall time) to finish the training process, from feature extraction to getting
all multi-set evaluation results.
4.3.3. Deriving the best cluster combination
However, different combinations may perform similarly. In such a case, two rules are proposed to choose
the best one, which is also the final step to achieve the detection model as shown in Fig. 2. First, when
multiple candidate combinations are available, the one with the shortest combination length is the best.
Here, the combination length is defined as the sum of the length of all patterns used in the combination.
For example, for {L-3, L-4, L-7}, the combination length is 3 + 4 + 7 = 14. Then, if there are still more
than one candidate, we use F1 measure to choose the best one. F1 measure is the harmonic average of the
precision and recall, which is defined in (6).
F1 = 2 ·
Precision ·Recall
Precison+ Recall
· 100%
=
2
1 + 1
DR
+ FAR
DR
· N1
N2
· 100% (6)
where
Recall = DR
Precision =
# of Correctly Detected Abnormal Traces
# of Detected Abnormal Traces
=
TP
TP + FP
where N1 is the number of normal testing traces, and N2 is the number of abnormal testing sequences. In
such a case, the one with the largest F1 will be considered the best.
5. Evaluations
5.1. Experiment Setups
The testbed was equipped with Intel Xeon E5-1650 v3 CPU, 32GB Memory and 1TB disk. The host
operating system was Ubuntu 16.04.3 x64, with Linux kernel version 4.4.108. We isolated either of localiza-
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tion and mapping components in a Xen virtual machine (VM) with 2 virtual CPUs and 2GB memory and
deployed the VMI-based monitor to capture the execution trace for analysis.
The evaluation contains two parts. In the first one (Sec. 5.2 and 5.3), we demonstrate how our approach
performs on securing the components of Autoware, which is the self-driving system of our ACRONIS Self-
Driving Car (modified from a Toyota COMMS Electrical Vehicle with a Velodyn VLP-16 Lidar, a Delphi
ESR 2.5 radar, a MTi-G-710-2A8G4 GPS/IMU module and a BFS-PGE-31S4C-C camera). In our early
work, we separated Autoware into 8 partitions: sensing, localization, data loading (mapping), fusion, object
tracking, path planning, motion planning, and path following, where sensing, localization and mapping are
isolated by partitions based on virtualization. Experiments were conducted on real data gathered from field
tests.
In the second part (Sec. 5.4), we used the ADFA-LD data set to prove the generalization of our method.
ADFA-LD is released for host-based anomaly detection, replacing the existing benchmarks such as the KDD-
98 and UNM data sets, whose applicability to modern computer systems is suspected. Besides, ADFA-LD
has a much larger degree of similarity between attack data and normal data than the KDD collections, which
is more complex and harder for detection analysis [10]. Thus, testing with ADFA-LD can further validate
our method.
5.2. Testing on GNSS Localization Partition
In this test, we used the sample data recorded in Japan and provided by Autoware project as the input
of the self-driving system. To get valid execution traces, we first ran the system and recorded all syscalls
issued by GNSS localization partition (mainly the nmea2tfpose program), which provided us 479 normal
traces as the 1-second monitoring window was used. Each normal trace contained 1274 syscalls averagely.
We divided those traces into the training set (240 traces for model training) and the normal testing data
set (239 traces).
Then, we ran a malicious program to act as an adversary. Such a program was coded to work as follows.
It stealthily gathered and sent resource usage data periodically to a remote server, and issued other critical
syscalls trying to disrupt any normal execution or crash other critical services. The whole process was to
simulate a hijacked program (e.g., Trojan), which was based on a legitimate system monitor agent embedded
in each partition. After the test, an abnormal data set of 479 invalid traces (as abnormal testing data) was
gathered. Each abnormal trace’ length was 1479 averagely.
We first trained the detection model with the training set where all data was normal, then tested the
model with both normal and abnormal testing data. To train the model, we first extracted features of the
pattern clusters from L-1 to L-15 based on Algorithm 1. With GNU bash time command, we recorded the
time overhead of the execution of our python implementation. The total time spent in parallel extracting
the features of these clusters was 6 minutes and 55.0 seconds.
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Table 3: Early results of the evaluation on Localization with single cluster [%].
k
ν 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.05 0.01
FAR DR FAR DR FAR DR FAR DR FAR DR
1 50.833 100.000 19.167 99.791 12.917 99.582 5.833 99.374 0.000 36.326
2 45.417 99.791 18.333 99.791 12.500 99.791 7.083 99.582 0.417 36.534
3 50.833 100.000 27.083 99.791 13.750 99.791 6.250 99.791 2.917 37.161
4 54.167 100.000 27.500 100.000 13.750 100.000 7.083 100.000 1.250 99.791
5 61.667 100.000 33.333 100.000 24.583 100.000 16.250 100.000 8.333 100.000
6 75.833 100.000 55.417 100.000 45.417 100.000 35.833 100.000 22.083 100.000
7 89.583 100.000 80.833 100.000 75.417 100.000 65.000 100.000 43.750 100.000
8 96.250 100.000 94.167 100.000 91.667 100.000 87.083 100.000 75.000 100.000
9 99.167 100.000 96.667 100.000 95.417 100.000 94.583 100.000 92.500 100.000
10 99.167 100.000 97.917 100.000 97.500 100.000 94.167 100.000 94.583 100.000
11 99.583 100.000 99.583 100.000 99.167 100.000 98.333 100.000 99.583 100.000
12 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 98.750 100.000 99.167 100.000
13 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 99.583 100.000 99.583 100.000
14 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000
15 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000
As shown in Table 3, after applying the method proposed in Sec. 4.3, the evaluation results indicated
that L-1 to L-8 clusters could form a potential candidate set as they provided better performance than
others when ν = 0.01.
Then, we used the extracted feature data sets in the previous evaluation to generate the inputs of SVM
under various combinations of different clusters. The total number of combinations is 28 − (8 + 1) = 247,
which took 8.2s (recorded by time command) to train and test them in parallel. Among all trials, we found
that when ν = 0.01, combinations such as {1, 8}, {1, 4, 8}, {1, 5, 8}, {1, 6, 8}, {1, 3, 5, 8}, {1, 3, 6, 8}, {1, 3,
7, 8}, {1, 4, 5, 8}, {1, 4, 6, 8}, {1, 4, 7, 8} and {1, 5, 6, 8}, etc. offered the best performance (F-measure =
0.999), as shown in Fig. 3. Note that 10-fold cross validation was adopted to reduce over-fitting during the
training for each combination. We chose {1, 8} since it was the shortest combination. The ROC (Receiver
Operating Characteristic) curves of different combinations were also shown in Fig. 4, which proved that using
the combination of L-1 and L-8 clusters, i.e., {1, 8}, significantly improved the classification performance.
We compared our approach with single-cluster classifiers and a multi-voter classifier. A single-cluster
classifier is a one-class SVM trained by the feature of a single cluster, and the multi-voter classifier contained
several single-cluster classifiers. The voter collected results from those individual classifiers and returned the
final result with their sum. If the sum is negative, then the voter returns “abnormal”, otherwise “normal”.
The results were shown in Table 4. We can conclude that compared with single-cluster classifiers, multi-
cluster classifier decreased FAR and maintained high DR, while the multi-voter classifier performed the
17
1, 8
3, 4
4, 7
7, 8
1, 3, 4
1, 4, 7
1, 7, 8
2, 4, 6
2, 6, 8
3, 5, 7
4, 5, 8
6, 7, 8
1, 2, 4, 6
1, 2, 6, 8
1, 3, 5, 7
1, 4, 5, 8
1, 6, 7, 8
2, 3, 5, 8
2, 4, 6, 7
3, 4, 5, 6
3, 5, 6, 8
5, 6, 7, 8
1, 2, 3, 5, 8
1, 2, 4, 6, 7
1, 3, 4, 5, 6
1, 3, 5, 6, 8
1, 5, 6, 7, 8
2, 3, 5, 6, 7
2, 4, 6, 7, 8
4, 5, 6, 7, 8
1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7
1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8
1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
F-
m
ea
su
re
Combination
 0.5  0.2  0.1
 0.05  0.01
Fig. 3: F-measure of the evaluations on localization partition with different ν.
Table 4: Comparison on Localization Partition
Classifier FAR(%) DR(%)
{1, 8} 0.417 100.000
{1} 5.833 99.374
{8} 75.000 100.000
{1} + {8} 73.000 100.000
worst by providing the highest FAR.
5.3. Testing on Mapping Partition
During the test, we used the mapping data gathered from our field test in Singapore as the workload for
the target software. The mapping partition broadcast vector maps and point-cloud maps of the driving area,
as shown in Fig. 5(a), which were collocated by our self-driving car in a field test, as shown in Fig. 5(b).
Our self-driving car circled the area following those waypoints in the map. Meanwhile, all syscalls issued by
the Mapping partition were captured and recorded. Like in Sec. 5.2, the model was built with training data
(normal traces), and evaluated with both normal and abnormal testing data.
Like the previous setup, we collected a normal data set consisting of 300 traces with 1-second monitoring
window. Those sequences were divided evenly into model training and normal testing data. After another
run with the aforementioned malicious program embedded, 300 abnormal traces were gathered in 5 minutes,
18
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
False Alarm Rate
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
D
e
te
ct
io
n
 R
a
te
ROC Curves
L-{1, 8} set (area = 1.00)
L-1 cluster (area = 0.97)
L-8 cluster (area = 0.62)
Fig. 4: ROC curves for the evaluations of the execution of localization partition (AREA = AUC).
(a) Map of the testing car park area. (b) Our Toyota COMS AV.
Fig. 5: Our ADV and the map generated by the car in the testing car park.
which were used as abnormal testing data. Among those data, each normal trace contained 617 elements,
while each abnormal one had 724, averagely.
The total time for parallel feature extraction of L-1 to L-12 clusters took 1 minute and 29.0 seconds.
Among the results shown in Table 5, L-1 to L-8 clusters can form the pattern set as ∆k,0.01 reaches the
minimum value when k = 8. Thus, the number of possible combinations was 28− (8+ 1) = 247, which took
6.31s to test them using the grid searching. The F-measure results are shown in Fig. 6, from which we could
conclude that when ν = 0.01, each combination achieved the best performance. Among the achieved results,
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Table 5: Early results of using single pattern set on Mapping [%].
0.5 0.2 0.1 0.05 0.01
FAR DR FAR DR FAR DR FAR DR FAR DR
1 56.000 100.000 17.333 99.667 10.000 99.667 2.667 95.333 0.667 93.667
2 33.333 99.667 14.000 99.667 10.000 99.333 2.000 98.000 0.000 97.333
3 48.667 100.000 20.667 100.000 16.667 100.000 8.667 100.000 6.000 100.000
4 52.667 100.000 24.000 100.000 16.000 100.000 14.000 100.000 7.333 100.000
5 65.333 100.000 40.000 100.000 27.333 100.000 22.000 100.000 12.667 100.000
6 87.333 100.000 73.333 100.000 63.333 100.000 47.333 100.000 36.667 100.000
7 93.333 100.000 86.000 100.000 83.333 100.000 80.667 100.000 62.000 100.000
8 99.333 100.000 98.667 100.000 98.000 100.000 97.333 100.000 93.333 100.000
9 99.333 100.000 99.333 100.000 99.333 100.000 98.667 100.000 98.667 100.000
10 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000
11 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000
12 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000
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Fig. 6: F-measure of the evaluations on mapping partition with different ν.
we found combinations of {1, 2, 5} and {1, 2, 6} yielded better results, achieving the best F-measure 0.998.
Thus, {1, 2, 5} was chosen as it was the shortest combination, as shown in Fig. 7. The comparison is shown
in Table 6, which suggested that the multi-cluster classifier achieved better results than single-cluster ones.
From the above two tests, we could find that combining multiple clusters did improve detection accuracy.
In the first simulation, combining {1, 8} reduced FAR by 92.85% (compared with only using L-1 cluster), and
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Fig. 7: ROC curves for the evaluations of the execution of mapping partition (AREA = AUC).
Table 6: Comparison on Mapping partition.
Classifier FAR(%) DR(%)
{1, 2, 5} 0.667 100.00
{1} 10.000 99.667
{2} 0.000 97.333
{5} 12.667 100.000
{1} + {2} + {5} 8.00 100.00
achieved 100% DR. In the second one, {1, 2, 5} reduced FAR by 93.33% (compared with using L-1 cluster
only), and achieved 100% DR. Even when compared with the multi-voter classifier, it greatly reduced FAR
by over 90.0%. The comparison showed that by combining multiple features, it can achieve the minimum
FAR and maximum DR among all single sets used.
5.4. Comparison with Other Methods on ADFA-LD
In both the above cases, most self-driving programs were running periodically, and the control logic
was not very complex, which might lead to the uniformity of syscalls and raise the similarity concern, i.e.
normal/abnormal data distributed differently to make detection easier. Although we had shown that it was
hard to distinguish the data (Table 3 and 5) with single features (similar to methods in [38]), we would
further evaluate our approach on the public ADFA-LD data set and compare the result with other similar
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Fig. 8: ROC curves of evaluations on ADFA-LD (AREA = AUC).
methods.
The ADFA-LD contains 833 training traces, 4372 validation (normal) traces and 746 attack (abnormal)
traces. Each training trace contains about 370 syscalls, each validation (normal testing) trace has 485 items,
and each attack (abnormal) trace has 426 elements, averagely. In the test, we used the training set to tune
the classifier, and tested it on the validation and attack sets.
From the early results in Table 1, we set ν = 0.01 and used L-1 to L-9 clusters to find a proper
combination. With GNU bash time command, the recorded time for parallel feature extraction was 24
minutes and 7 seconds, including building the clusters and computing their frequencies. Training and
testing 29− (9+1) = 502 trials took 1 minute and 19.8 second. Among all attempts, we found combinations
{1, 2, 6}, {1, 3, 6}, {1, 2, 5, 6}, {1, 3, 4, 6}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 7} and {1, 2, 3, 5, 6} had better performance (higher
F-measures), as shown in Fig. 9. However, {1, 2, 5, 6}, {1, 3, 4, 6} and {1, 2, 3, 5, 6} were removed since
they can be regarded as extensions of {1, 2, 6} and {1, 3, 6}. We compared {1, 2, 6}, {1, 3, 6} and {1, 2, 3,
4, 7} and showed their ROC curves in Fig. 8. Even though their AUCs (Area Under the Curve) were almost
the same, {1, 2, 6} provided better classification performance than others since it has the largest F-measure
with DR = 83.6% and FAR = 18.9%.
We compared the achieved results with ones reported by the following works, among which either the
SVM based solution or other fast detection method was chosen, and the same amount of data was used
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Fig. 9: F-measure of evaluations on ADFA-LD with different ν.
for training and testing. Those included: Creech et al [11] used one-class SVM with semantic features,
achieving DR of 80% at 15% FAR, but the training overhead was expensive as it took weeks for extracting
the semantic features. Marteau [26] used covering similarity with only the training data set (no additional
training data from the validation set), achieving DR of 80% at 19% FAR. Xie et al [39, 37] combined k-
nearest neighbors (k-NN) and k-mean clustering approaches and achieved DR of 60% at FAR of 20%, In
another work [38], they used short sequences and frequency features to train a one-class SVM, and achieved
DR of 70% at FAR of 20%. Haider et al [16] used four statistical features, i.e., the least/most repeated
and the minimum/maximum values in a trace, to represent a trace and detect attacks. They used three
supervised learning algorithms: SVMs with linear and radial basis kernels and k-NN, and the best result
was k-NN with a 78% DR at 21% FAR. As shown in Table 7, compared with those best results quoted
from each publication, our proposed method could get a good detection performance while still took only
minutes’ training. For example, compared with [26], our approach achieves better results while reducing the
size of the pattern set with the proposed method in Sec. 4.3.2, and our approach runs much faster than [11]
while maintaining similar performance. Please note that some papers only reported the feature extraction
time (the overall execution time will be longer).
23
Table 7: Comparison of different methods on ADFA-LD.
Methods FAR(%) DR(%)
Training
Time
Marteau [26], training
the SVM with only the
training data set
19.0 80.0 minutes
Creech et al [11]: SVM
with semantic features
15.0 80.0 weeks
Xie et al [39, 37]: k-NN
and k-mean clustering
20.0 60.0 seconds
Xie et al [38]: frequen-
cies of short sequences
and one-class SVM
20.0 70.0 seconds
Haider et al [16]: sta-
tistical features and
SVM
21.0 78.0 seconds
Proposed method 18.9 83.6 minutes
5.5. Overhead analysis
The achieved results show that feature extraction takes more time than training SVM models. The
process of feature extraction traverses the entire training data set and calculates the feature vector of each
trace in both training and testing data sets. Hence, such a process is subjective to the data amount.
However, since each extraction attempt is independent, such a process can run in parallel to extract a single
L-k cluster and calculate the frequency features. Hence, only the maximum extracting time matters. The
extraction is essentially a string search process, and the number of traces n, the maximal trace length l and
the number of desired clusters m affect the processing time greatly. The time complexity of such a process
is O(nlm). In our evaluation, training a one-class SVM doesn’t take much time. Although the input data
size matters, training an SVM model takes averagely less than a second in our experiments.
6. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we propose an inexpensive detection method using syscalls to monitor the execution of
critical software functions of self-driving systems. Such a method extracts the syscall pattern of normal
traces and uses the invocation frequency of multiple pattern clusters as featured inputs to train a one-
class SVM based detection model. The evaluation shows the proposed method can further reduce the false
alarm rate and maintain high accuracy based on the test on real data obtained from the self-driving system
Autoware. A further comparison against existing works with the ADFA-LD data set demonstrates that such
a method improves the detection performance with short training time.
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This work shows that combining multiple features could improve detection performance. It is also possible
to apply such a method in other domains. In the future, we plan to extend the approach by stealthily
intercepting other critical APIs to trace programs’ behaviors (e.g. computation) more accurately, or by
mapping several contiguous syscalls to an API invocation (e.g. ros :: T ime :: now() and its corresponding
set of syscalls). In such a way, we may better understand the execution, which could help model the
self-driving functions more precisely.
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